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PROPERTY
I. LATENT DEFECTS AND IMPLIED HABITABILITY
Thacker v. Tyree, 297 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1982).
Gamble v. Main, 300 S.E.2d 110 (W. Va. 1983).
A new measure of consumer protection against vendors of defective hous-
ing has been provided as the court continues to chip away at the concept of
caveat emptor in real estate transactions. In Thacker v. Tyree1 the court ruled
for the first time that a seller's willful failure to reveal a hidden defect that
could substantially affect the value or habitability of a home can create a
cause of action for fraud. In another ground-breaking decision, the court held
in Gamble v. Main2 that a builder-vendor of a new home gives his purchaser
an implied warranty that the building is reasonably fit for habitation.
Although the doctrines developed in these cases have precedential support in
other jurisdictions, they represent a substantial new direction in West
Virginia property law.
In Thacker, the appellants purchased a home from the appellees which
developed substantial problems with the foundation. The Thackers learned
that the damage was caused by a subsurface water problem that the Tyrees
had known about but failed to disclose during the purchase period.'
An action for fraudulent concealment was brought charging that the
Tyrees had failed to reveal a known latent defect. The Tyrees sought sum-
mary judgment, asserting that no questions had been asked about the house's
quality and no express misrepresentations had been made. The Cabell Coun-
ty Circuit Court granted summary judgment, holding that fraudulent conceal-
ment of a defect in a house did not give rise to a cause of action in West
Virginia.4
In reversing the lower ruling, the supreme court carefully placed its deci-
sion in the context of its continuing strong hostility toward the doctrine of
caveat emptor in property law.' The court noted its recent decision in
Lengyel v. Lint6 as a reaffirmation of the notion that a vendor of real prop-
erty may not erect caveat emptor as a barrier against a charge of fraud.7
1 297 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1982).
2 300 S.E.2d 110 (W. Va. 1983).
' 297 S.E.2d at 886.
4Id.
ICf. Southern Erectors, Inc. v. Olga Coal Co., 223 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1976) (building
contracts).
6 280 S.E.2d 66 (W. Va. 1981). The court considered a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation
in relation to the size of the lot and the quality of the house sold by the vendor. The court noted
that "It has long been the law in West Virginia that a vendor of real property may be liable to the
vendee in an action for fraud." Id. at 69.
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The issue of first impression in Thacker was whether "nondisclosure of a
material latent defect not known or discoverable by the exercise of diligence
on the part of the purchaser constitutes fraud."8 A survey of prior West
Virginia cases led to the conclusion that concealment of the truth could pro-
vide a basis for a fraud action9 even though it had not hitherto been applied
to the sale of real property. The court also found a substantial number of
decisions from other jurisdictions that recognized fraudulent concealment as
a cause of action in property disputes."
The Thacker court based its expansion of the fraudulent concealment
doctrine into the area of real property on the support of decisions from other
jurisdictions. It held that a cause of action can arise when a vendor of a house
knows of but fails to reveal a defect. The defect must substantially affect the
value or habitability of the property. It must also be unknown to the pur-
chaser and of such a nature that it would not be disclosed by a reasonably
diligent inspection."
The Thacker decision, as do many pioneer rulings, may raise as many
questions as it answers. Clearly a seller of housing in West Virginia can no
longer rely on the careful avoidance of express misrepresentation or the
failure of a prospective buyer to ask questions as an absolute protection
against subsequent legal action. Beyond that point linger a number of issues
that await litigation. How extensive must a defect be in order to "substantial-
ly affect" the value or habitability of a home? How much time will a buyer be
allowed to discover such a defect? What is the appropriate remedy for
fraudulent concealment?
The answers are more difficult to provide than the questions. Our court
has shown a willingness to rely on judicial theories developed in other states.
It has also demonstrated a disconcerting tendency to pick and choose
elements of a doctrine that it finds congenial while ignoring others. Predic-
tions, therefore, become hazardous.
The foreign cases on which the court relied in Thacker generally involved
prominent defects readily discoverable soon after the sale. Courts applying
the concept of latent defect have tended to respond by granting rescission of
the sales contract'2 although damages have been allowed on some occasions.' 3
Whether we will follow this pattern must wait until a fuller application of the
latent defect doctrine has been judicially explored.
' 297 S.E.2d at 887.
' Frazer v. Brewer, 52 W. Va. 306, 43 S.E. 110 (1902) ("Fraud is the concealment of truth just
as much as it is the utterance of a falsehood:' Id. at 310, 43 S.E. at 111).
1o See, e.g., Cohen v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443, 349 P.2d 366 (1960); Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64
N.J. 445, 317 A.2d 68 (1974); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash. 2d 449, 353 P.2d 672 (1960).
" 297 S.E.2d at 888.
2 See Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445, 317 A.2d 68 (1974).
19841
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The protection offered to a purchaser by the decision in Thacker was
predicated upon a wrongful act by the vendor. In Gamble v. Main" the court
expanded a purchaser's rights still further by recognizing that a right of ac-
tion could exist grounded in an implied warranty of habitability in new home
sales.
The appellants had been considering purchasing a certain lot for the pur-
pose of building a home. They consulted Main, a builder, on the suitability of
the land. After a brief examination, Main pronounced the lot acceptable. The
Gambles purchased the land and employed Main to build their home and an
accompanying septic system. Approximately a year after taking possession
the Gambles discovered that the lot was slipping and causing extensive
damage to the septic system."'
After Main declined to repair the septic system, suit was brought alleg-
ing that Main had impliedly guaranteed the suitability of the building site."
In his answer, Main argued that West Virginia did not recognize implied war-
ranties in the sale and construction of homes. He also asserted that even if
such a warranty did exist, it did not extend to latent soil conditions which the
builder could not reasonably discover.
17
The trial court declined to instruct the jury on the issue of implied war-
ranties on the grounds that it was not applicable. The jury then reached a
verdict in favor of Main."
The manner in which the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ap-
proached the issues in Gamble reflected a clear determination to create a
new remedy for aggrieved home buyers even though the final ruling affirmed
the lower decision. The supreme court found that the majority of existing
cases did not hold a builder responsible for soil conditions that were unknown
and not reasonably discoverable."
The issues in Gamble could have been resolved without addressing the
broader question of implied warranties. The fact that the court chose to go
beyond a limited holding and to rule expansively on the issue of implied war-
ranty unmistakenly demonstrates a commitment to harmonize West Virginia
property law with the more liberal developments in other areas.
The court recognized that the doctrine of implied warranty was a
,3 See Ware v. Scott, 220 Va. 317, 257 S.E.2d 855 (1979).
" 300 S.E.2d 110 (W. Va. 1983).
15 Id. at 111.
1Id.
'7 Id. at 112.
II Id. at 111.
"E.g., Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975); Lewis v. Anchorage Asphalt Paving
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judicially created protection that had been steadily gaining support in other
jurisdictions. 21 In analyzing the reasons why the doctrine has found judicial
favor the court cited with approval the New Jersey case of McDonald v.
Mianecki.
21
The Mianecki court found a justification for implied warranties in the
buyer's need to rely on the vendor. In its opinion, the seller's superior
knowledge and bargaining position coupled with his unique ability to prevent
harm argued for an equitable counterweight on behalf of the buyer.2
Clearly the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found the logic of
the Mianecki court convincing. It has not, however, accepted all of the points
involved in the decision. For example, the homeowner who builds his own
house and sells it on a nonrecurring basis is specifically exempted.' The
court gives no authority for this exception. It seems to be simply a matter of
judicial preference.
Just as Thacker raised questions, so also does the holding in Gamble. The
court by its own admission has not considered all the ramifications of its rul-
ing.24 Even if Mianecki sets a pattern that West Virginia may follow, it leaves
unanswered such concerns as:
1. Will third party actions be permitted, or is privity required to maintain
an action?
2. Are implied warranties contained only in new houses or can they be ex-
tended to used homes?
3. Is it possible to disclaim such warranties?
4. What is the proper measure of damages for violation of an implied war-
ranty?
The decisions in Thacker and Gamble may signal a new era in the field of
West Virginia housing. The full extent of the changes inherent in these rul-
ings is difficult to estimate at this early moment, but it is apparent that the
court has expressed a strong antipathy toward the use of caveat emptor to
deny protection for the housing consumer.
II. ADJOINING LANDOWNER'S RIGHT TO LATERAL SUPPORT
Noone v. Price, 298 S.E.2d 218 (W.Va. 1982).
The court in Noone v. Price" addressed the responsibility of landowners
to provide lateral support to adjoining property owners. The opinion of the
1 300 S.E.2d at 113.
21 79 N.J. 275, 398 A.2d 1283 (1979).
' Id. at 1289-90.
2 300 S.E.2d at 115 n.6.
2 Id. at 115.
2 298 S.E.2d 218 (W. Va. 1982).
1984]
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court was ostensibly based upon long existing common law and the earlier
West Virginia decisions in the field. The conclusion reached, however, repre-
sents a substantial revision in the West Virginia view of lateral support.
The appellants had purchased a home on a hill above the property owned
by the appellee, Ms. Price. The appellee's predecessors in title had erected a
retaining wall between the two tracts. The Noones' property began to slip
causing damage to their house. The Noones asserted the slippage was due to
Price's failure to maintain the wall and brought an action for damages to
their house.2
The Fayette County Circuit Court granted partial summary judgment on
behalf of Price, holding that while there was a duty to support adjoining land,
the duty did not extend to structures on the land. The Noones were entitled
to recover damages to their land if they could prove a loss of lateral support
but they had no claim to damages for their house.27
Justice Neely, writing for the court, reviewed the existing law on lateral
support and found that removal of support could invoke either strict liability
or liability for negligence, depending on the circumstances. 8 The general
rule, as stated in McCabe v. City of Parkersburg," is that a landowner is en-
titled, ex Jure naturae, to lateral support for his soil in the adjacent land. The
right of support is "a property right and absolute."' The removal of this sup-
port by the adjoining landowner subjects him to strict liability for the
damage to his neighbor's land."
The application of strict liability, however, has traditionally been limited
to land in its natural state. The adjoining landowner has no obligation to sup-
port the added weight of buildings or other structures.2
The liability for support of structures on the land involves the question of
negligence. If the structures are actually being supported, the neighbor who
withdraws this support must do it in a reasonable manner.23
Since the retaining wall in question had preceded the construction of the
house on appellant's property, the court noted that the wall need only be suf-
ficient to support the land in its natural state.U The removal of natural sup-
port and its replacement with artificial support created an incident on the
2 Id. at 220.
21 Id. at 221-22.
Id. at 221.
138 W. Va. 830, 79 S.E.2d 87 (1953).
Walker v. Strosnider, 67 W. Va. 39, 67 S.E. 1087 (1910) (syllabus point one by the court).
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land compelling subsequent owners to maintain that support but only to the
extent of its original responsibility.3 5
The analysis at this juncture would seem in accordance with that of the
circuit court. Justice Neely noted, however, that even though the lower tri-
bunal had correctly identified the issue as one of strict liability, it had failed
to apply the rule correctly to the question of recoverable damages.28
The application of strict liability in Noone, although characterized as a
correction, actually represented a substantial departure from existing West
Virginia doctrine. Justice Neely implicitly recognized this departure when he
noted that his view had never been expressly stated by a West Virginia
court." The court in Noone held that while strict liability for lateral support
did relate only to land in its natural condition, if the removal of support
would have caused the land in question to subside without the added weight
of existing structures, then the responsibility for damages extended to both
the land and the structures on it.,
Under the doctrine developed in Noone the simplistic rule that damages
to structures caused by a loss of lateral support can never be recovered with-
out proof of negligence has been replaced by a consideration of the causes of
land subsidence. An adjoining landowner may no longer assume that with-
drawal of lateral support conveys no responsibility for structures. Strict li-
ability for all damages is now applicable if the land in its natural state is cap-
able of supporting the structure, and if the weight of the structure is not a
factor in subsidence.
The rule in Noone can be interpreted as a reasonable modernization of
West Virginia property law. It brings our interpretation of the right to lat-
eral support into line with what the court regards as the majority view in the
nation39 as well as with the view expressed by the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.4 o
III. JOINT TENANCY
Herring v. Carroll, 300 S.E.2d 629 (W.Va. 1983).
The rules governing land tenure and transfer were once the sole province
of the common law. In West Virginia, as elsewhere, the common law has been
Id. at 222.
3 Id. at 220-21.
, Id. at 221.
3 Id.
39 Id.
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 817 comment N (1979):
[T]he actor ... is subject to this liability for harm to artificial additions on the sup-
ported land that may be caused by his withdrawal of the naturally necessary support.
1984]
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altered and in some areas supplanted by statute. The case of Herring v. Car-
roll" provided the court with an opportunity to clarify the extent to which
the common law rules on joint tenancy have survived the intervention of
statutory law.
At common law joint tenancy was the preferred estate. Each tenant held
an undivided share in the whole with the right of survivorship. Joint tenancy
arose not by specific words in a document but through the creation of what
was known as the four unities: (1) Time. Each party's undivided interest must
vest at the same time; (2) Estate. Each party must receive an undivided inter-
est in the whole estate; (3) Interest. Each party's interest must be co-equal as
to estate and duration; (4) Title. Each party must receive his interest in the
same document.
2
Joint tenancy which often left descendants of the original joint tenants
without an interest in the land has gradually lost favor to the estate known
as tenancy in common. The tenancy in common allowed each tenant an undiv-
ided share in the whole and couldbe created without the requirements of the
four unities but did not include a right of survivorship."
The West Virginia position on tenancy was established in West Virginia
Code section 36-1-19" and section 36-1-20.1 The two statutes have been inter-
preted as requiring a conveyance to two or more persons to be regarded as
tenancy in common unless joint tenancy is clearly intended by the
document."'
This relatively straight-forward reversal of the common law presumption
has been greatly complicated by subsequent statutes and judicial decisions.
The 1981 amendment to section 36-1-20T stated that the use of the disjunctive
"or" in a conveyance to multiple owners created joint tenancy with sur-
He becomes liable to the other . . . when, a subsidence of the other's land that was
naturally dependent upon the support withdrawn occurs. When harm to artificial addi-
tions results from the subsidence, the actor is liable for the harm.
41 300 S.E.2d 629 (W. Va. 1983).
Id. at 631.
43 Brown, Some Aspects of Joint Ownership in Real Property in West Virginia, 63 W. VA. L.
REV. 207, 209 (1961).
" W. VA. CODE § 36-1-19 (1982 & Supp. 1983)
When any joint tenant or tenant by the entireties of an interest in real or personal prop-
erty, whether such interest be a present interest or by way of reversion or remainder or
other future interest, shall die, his share shall descend or be disposed of as if he had
been a tenant in common.
's W. VA. CODE § 36-1-20 (1982 & Supp. 1983) provides:
The preceding section [§ 36-1-19] shall not apply to any estate ... when it manifestly ap-
pears from the tenor of the instrument that it was intended that the part of one dying
should then belong to the others.
4" E.g., DeLong v. Farmers Bldg. and Loan Ass'n, 148 W. Va. 625, 137 S.E.2d 11 (1964).
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vivorship unless the language of the conveyance expressly declared other-
wise. The earlier reversal achieved by sections 36-1-19 and 36-1-20 was at
least partially undone.
A further complication was added by West Virginia Code section
48-3-7a,48 which permitted a husband or wife to convey to his or her partner
an undivided interest in a whole estate with the right of survivorship. This
creation of joint tenancy was not possible at common law because such a con-
veyance without an intervening straw party attempted to create joint ten-
ancy without the required unities.49
This confusing interplay of statutory revisions culminated in the broad
statement of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in State ex tel
Miller v. Sencindiver 5 "[B]y the Legislature's modification of the common
law concerning joint tenancies, tenancies by the entireties, and cotenancies
... the Legislature has in effect preempted the matter."5
The appellants in Herring relied heavily upon that statement of judicial frus-
tration in Sencindiver.
Mr. and Mrs. George Herring had owned land conveyed to them as joint
tenants. Mrs. Herring subsequently conveyed her interest away to a son by a
prior marriage. 2 At common law such a conveyance was permitted, but it had
the effect of transforming the joint tenancy into a tenancy in common
through the rupture of the four unities. The tenants controlling the land no
longer had a right of survivorship in the whole.3
Mr. Herring and, after his death, his son and daughter sought to have
Mrs. Herring's conveyance nullified. Their theory was that if the legislature
had truly preempted the field as suggested in Sencindiver then the four un-
ities and their common law applications were no longer a force in West Vir-
ginia. In the absence of the four unities, the language of the original convey-
ance which granted a right of survivorship controlled the relationship.'
The court rejected appellant's theory and distinguished the Sencindiver
holding in such a manner as to largely repudiate its expansive statement on
legislative presumption,5 The decision in Sencindiver was narrowly char-
acterized as only an interpretation of West Virginia Code section 42-4-2"8
's W. VA. CODE § 48-3-7 (1974) (repealed 1981).
' 300 S.E.2d at 631.
275 S.E.2d 10 (W. Va. 1980).
' Id. at 14.
300 S.E.2d at 631.
0 Id. at 632.
Id. at 633.
nId.
W. VA. CODE § 42-4-2 (1982). The statute aims at preventing a person "who has been con-
victed of feloniously killing another" from obtaining "any money or property ... from the one
19841
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rather than a general statement on the viability of common law elements
such as the four unities.57
The court also reasoned that the adoption of West Virginia Code section
48-3-7a"8 implied the continued application of the unities since the type of con-
veyance legalized by that statute was an exception to the common law on
joint tenancy. A specific exception would not be required if the general rule
was no longer effective. 9
The court acknowledged that it had never determined if a West Virginia
joint tenancy could be unilaterally destroyed by one party conveying away
his interest. 0 Since it had already determined that the common law on joint
tenancy still had force in West Virginia, the court applied the standard com-
mon law interpretation and held that the right of a joint tenant to end sur-
vivorship was an element in joint tenancy properly utilized in Herring."
Although the common law on joint tenancy has undergone legislative tin-
kering, certain underlying principles remain. The right of survivorship in the
whole is ultimately subject to the whims of the tenants. The removal of any
of the four unities, except in cases of statutorily created exception, converts
joint tenancy into tenancy in common despite the contrary wishes of the re-
maining tenants or the express language in a conveyance.
IV. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN DEEDS
Allred v. City of Huntington, 304 S.E.2d 358 (W.Va. 1983).
The decision in Allred v. City of Huntington2 strongly reaffirmed the
validity of reasonable restrictive covenants when utilized in deeds as a means
of private zoning. It also recognized the continued importance of proper and
thorough title searches in determining when such covenants are in existence.
The appellant originated the action seeking an injunction when her sub-
division neighbor began construction of a garage beyond a set-back line re-
striction present in both chains of title. At trial the lower court agreed that
the restriction was present and binding but nevertheless allowed the
neighbor to leave in place the equivalent of a carpott. The roof and support
column of the structure extended beyond the set-back line. 3 The trial court
killed ... either by descent and distribution, or by will, or by any policy or certificate of insurance
or otherwise ...."
" 300 S.E.2d at 631.
0 W. VA. CODE § 48-3-7 (1974) (repealed 1981).
"' 300 S.E.2d at 634.
6 Id. at 632.
Id. at 634.
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apparently believed such an addition was not a permanent structure within
the meaning of the restrictive covenant.
The use of restrictive covenants has substantial precedential support in
West Virginia. The court in Wallace v. St. Clair64 compared them to zoning
and found such covenants to be "lawful and laudable. If the restrictions are
reasonable in nature and purpose they are upheld.
65
Set-back lines were specifically sustained in Kaminsky v. Barr." The re-
sponsibility of landowners for dipcovering the existence of such restrictions
was clearly established by the court in Recco v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co.67
Satisfied with the underlying validity of restrictive covenants, the Sup-
reme Court of Appeals considered three possible arguments against their ap-
plication in the Allred case. First, the decision in Morris v. Hease68 recogn-
ized that restrictive covenants could lose their force if changes in a neighbor-
hood were sufficiently substantial to nullify the need for the restriction. The
court in Allred, however, found no evidence that such a change had
occurred.69
The court accepted the possibility that the meaning of the word "struc-
ture" contained in the covenant could be debated. This analysis implied the
possibility that some form of construction might extend beyond the set-back
line and yet not violate the covenant.
The court's survey of case law found no West Virginia holding that ruled
specifically on carports. A substantial number of cases from other jurisdic-
tions, however, applied a stringent standard of limitation against similar
types of construction that violated set-back restrictions." Accepting the ex-
amples provided, the court held that a carport was a "sufficiently
substantial" structure to be considered a violation of the covenant.7
The court also considered and firmly rejected an argument that the ap-
pellant was estopped from bringing her action since she had allegedly al-
lowed the construction to proceed when the neighbors were ignorant of the
covenant. The responsibility of a landowner to search his chain of title for the
existence of restrictions is well established.7 '2 The constructive notice of the
147 W. Va. 377, 127 S.E.2d 742 (1962) (per curiam).
Id. at 389, 127 S.E.2d at 751.
" 106 W. Va. 201, 145 S.E. 267 (1928).
" 127 W. Va. 32, 32 S.E.2d 449 (1944).
238 S.E.2d 844 (W. Va. 1977).
304 S.E.2d at 360.
, E.g., Gilbert v. Repertory, Inc., 302 Mass. 105, 18 N.E.2d 437 (1939) (theatre marquee); Mc-
Galliard v. Chapman, 3 N.J. Misc. 609, 129 A. 256 (1925) (canvas roof of a vegetable stand).
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public record thus imposed in West Virginia may have applications that seem
harsh in individual cases. Nevertheless, the duty to search the existing
records for limitations on land use is so basic to West Virginia property law
that a party who fails to make such a search can expect little judicial sym-
pathy.
V. PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS
Veach v. Day, No. 15359 (W. Va. June 30, 1983).
An effort was made in Veach v. Day3 to fashion a definition of "con-
tinued" or "continuous" use as it relates to the creation of a prescriptive
easement. The basic requirements of such a right of way were stated in Town
of Paden City v. Felton:"
To establish an easement by prescription there must be continued and un-
interrupted use or enjoyment for at least ten years, identity of the thing en-
joyed, and a claim of right adverse to the owner of the land, known to and ac-
quiesced in by him, but if the use is by permission of the owner, an easement
is not created by such use.:
Utilizing the Paden City definition, the Grant County Circuit Court found
that the appellees had gained a prescriptive right of way across land belong-
ing to the appellants." The evidence in support of the claim showed that the
appellees crossed the land approximately five times a year to hunt, and had
done so for more than ten years."
The supreme court conceded that no West Virginia case had ever dis-
cussed the requirements of "continued use," but a survey of decisions from
other jurisdictions strongly suggested that the lower court had applied a
standard that was far too lenient. The holdings in a Massachusetts case,
Uliasz v. Gillette78 and in a Texas case, Fanin v. Somervell County79 were
cited to support a ruling that "occasional or sporadic" use is not sufficiently
continuous to support a prescriptive easement. In the court's opinion a few
hunting trips are clear examples of sporadic use."
The ruling in Veach offers little new clarification to the issue of prescrip-
tive easements. A definition of "continued use" as that which is not "sporadic
or occasional" is comparable to defining light as that which is not dark.
" No. 15359 (W. Va. June 30, 1983).
"' 136 W. Va. 127, 66 S.E.2d 280 (1951).
" No. 15359, slip op. at 4 (citing Town of Paden City v. Felton, 136 W. Va. 127, 66 S.E.2d 280
(1951)).
78 No. 15359, slip op. at 2.
7 Id. at 2-3.
357 Mass. 96, 256 N.E.2d 290 (1970).
450 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
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Clearly a few random crossings of land such as those offered in Veach will not
support a prescriptive easement. However, the question remains whether a
use lying between the extremes of daily use and a small number of infrequent
crossings could create a prescriptive right.
VI. JOINT ACCOUNTS
Waggy v. Waggy, 301 S.E.2d 843 (W.Va. 1983).
The case of Waggy v. Waggy8' presented the court with an opportunity
to restate its earlier opinions on the property rights created by a joint bank
account. It also provided an occasion for a judicial reaffirmation of the im-
portance of public records.
Two brothers, Carson and Reed Waggy, disputed the ownership of three
certificates of deposit. The certificates had been owned by their father prior
to his death in 1971. Carson Waggy asserted that his father had given the
certificates to him before his death. For a time he placed the certificates in
both his brother's name as well as in his own, but later had Reed's name re-
moved.2
In a suit to dissolve a farming partnership between the brothers, a court-
appointed commissioner had determined that the certificates were the sole
property of Carson Waggy.1 An appeal of the ruling concentrated on two fac-
tual issues: the presence for a time of Reed's name on the certificates' and
the commissioner's refusal to consider new evidence of the estate assessment
of the elder Waggy, which tended to prove that the certificates were part of
the estate.85
The court concluded that the first issue fell within the limitations of West
Virginia Code section 31A-4-338" as interpreted in the case of Dorsey v.
Short.' The Code states that joint bank accounts bearing the names of two or
more persons create joint tenancy in the property within the account, but the
Dorsey court also recognized that the person donating the funds could show
during his lifetime that joint tenancy was not his intention.'
The evidence before the commission showed that Reed Waggy never had
physical possession of the certificates and at no time were they stored with
the assets of the partnership. The court concluded that the commissioner's




" Id. at 845.
W . VA. CODE § 31A-4-33 (1982).
157 W. Va. 866, 205 S.E.2d 687 (1974).
Id. at 872, 205 S.E.2d at 690-91.
19841
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judgment that no intention existed to create a lasting joint tenancy of the
certificates was justified. 9
The commissioner's exclusion of the estate assessment was upheld on a
theory that almost resembles equitable laches. The assessment was filed in
1971, but the appellant did not seek to introduce it until 1981, well after a
series of earlier actions before the commissioner. The court relied on the
failure of such information to meet the West Virginia standard for new evid-
ence." A closer reading of the decision suggests another reason for upholding
the exclusion of the evidence. The court was expressing a strong sentiment
in favor of the intelligent use of public record. A party who fails promptly to
find support for a claim when that support is readily available in the public
record may find it difficult to convince a West Virginia court to view its pro-
ferred evidence at a later time.
VII. HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS AND THE DOCTRINE OF CY PRES
In re Estate of Teubert, 298 S.E.2d 456 (W.Va. 1982).
The factual situation surrounding In re Estate of Teubert" generated
enormous publicity. The deceased, a retired postal employee whom the court
described in admirable understatement as "extremely frugal," had amassed
an estate of approximately three million dollars before his death in 1979.11
Discovered among his personal papers was a document bearing the head-
ing "Law Will, Etc. 9-1-71." The paper was in the decedent's handwriting,
with the exception of a number of typewritten lines which read "(Revolking
[sic] all writings or wills heretofore made by C.J. Teubert) All this for TRUST
DEPT., First Huntington Nat'l. Bk. Huntington W. Va."'"
The handwritten portion of the writing appeared to devise certain real
property to the Jehovah's Witnesses; call for the creation of a "James H. and
Alice Teubert Foundation" to oversee the disbursement of funds to various
recipients, both private and charitable; and finally, to grant the residue of the
estate to aid the blind. The document was executed by the decedent. 5
The Cabell County Circuit Court overruled the county commission and
admitted the writing to probate as a valid holographic will.9 Teubert's heirs
appealed on the basis of three principle objections:
801 S.E.2d at 844.
Id. at 845.
91 Id.
91 298 S.E.2d 456 (W. Va. 1982).
"3 Id. at 458.
94Id.
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(1) W.Va. Code § 41-1-3 which governs holographic wills requires that they
be "wholly in the handwriting of the testator." The typewritten portion
therefore disqualifies the document."
(2) The document lacks testamentary intent and is nothing more than notes
for a will."
(3) If intent is present, the objects of the proposed bequests are too vague
and uncertain to be enforced.10
In its consideration of these arguments, the court clearly and expressly
began its analysis with certain underlying assumptions. Foremost of these
was the concept that the law favors testacy over intestacy.' °' A purposeful
analysis of the statutory recognition of holographic wills also suggested to
the court that individuals who choose to make their own wills without legal
assistance should not be held to rigid standards of formalism.12
These sympathetic presumptions in favor of testacy and valid holo-
graphic wills were reflected in the court's disposition of the appellant's claim
that the typewriting disqualified the paper as not being "wholly in
writing." ' 3 Other jurisdictions with statutes governing holographic wills
recognize a theory known as "surplusage." Under such a theory "nonhand-
written material in a holographic will may be stricken with the remainder of
the instrument being admitted to probate if the remaining provisions make
sense standing alone."'0 4 The court found the surplusage concept to be fully
comr,' ible with its views on holographic wills and expressly adopted the con-
cept."t-
The adoption of the surplusage theory moved consideration of the type-
written words on the document out of the narrow arena of legal formalism
and into a factual evaluation of their effect on the writing. The lower court
had concluded that the typewritten words were not necessary to an intelli-
gent reading of the remainder. The supreme court of appeals agreed.'
The issue of testamentary intent in the writing also raised substantial
W. VA. CODE § 41-1-3 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
No will shall be valid unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by some
other person in his presence and by his direction, in such a manner as to make it mani-
fest that the name is intended as a signature; and moreover unless it be wholly in the
handwriting of the testator, the signature shall be made ... in the presence of at least
two competent witnesses.
08 298 S.E.2d at 459.
Id. at 460-61.
Id. at 462.
,o Id. at 460.
102 Id.
W' . VA. CODE § 41-1-3 (1982).
"0 298 S.E.2d at 459.
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questions on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to prove that intent. The
court noted that West Virginia Code section 41-1-3 required testamentary in-
tent in a writing. However, the court in Runyon v. Mills1' held that no par-
ticular form of words are necessary to demonstrate that intent. The case of
In re Briggs Estate"0 8 also clearly established that extrinsic evidence is ad-
missible to show testamentary intent when the words of the will are ambig-
uous.
The broad admissibility standard in Briggs may have been reduced in
Teubert. The court suggested that extrinsic evidence is subject to a two-
stage analysis. An initial determination of whether the document has some
"formal indicia of testamentary intent"'1 9 must be made before the introduc-
tion of further evidence is permitted. The words "last will" and the testator's
signature on the Teubert document met the court's standard of "indicia.'" 11
Among the evidence offered below was an unsigned codicil which made
direct reference to the document in controversy as a will. The codicil was
judged to possess high probative value. The remaining extrinsic evidence
was admittedly not without conflict, but the deference traditionally due a
trial court's factual determination unless plainly wrong argued against re-
versal."'
The appellants' third argument seemed to offer the greatest opportunity
for success. Their contention that a will must have clear terms has strong
case support. In Hunt v. Furman"' the court held that "[a] valid disposition of
personal property requires a definite subject and object.""' The bequest in
Teubert "to aid the blind" seemed to fail that standard. Furthermore, the
Teubert document sought to create a foundation that would administer funds
for private and charitable beneficiaries. A creation of that sort could be char-
acterized as a mixed trust, an arrangement that the court in Goetz v. Old
National Bank of Martinsburg"' found unacceptable.
The court found no merit, however, in these objections. The mixed trust
arrangement in Teubert was viewed as avoiding the flaw that had troubled
the Goetz court by providing for a clear method of apportionment among the
charitable and private beneficiaries."5
The seemingly vague bequest "to aid the blind" did not, in the court's
1 86 W. Va. 383, 103 S.E. 112 (1920).
" 148 W. Va. 294, 134 S.E.2d 737 (1964).
1 298 S.E.2d at 461.
110 Id.
"I E.g., Mundy v. Arcuri, 267 S.E.2d 454 (W. Va. 1980).
12 132 W. Va. 706, 52 S.E.2d 816 (1949).
" Id. at 711, 52 S.E.2d at 818.
" 140 W. Va. 422, 84 S.E.2d 759 (1954).
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view, fall under the control of Hunt v. Furman. The validity of the bequest
was said to be upheld by West Virginia Code sections 35-2-1116 and 35-2-2.' ' 7
These two provisions represent a statutory embodiment of the English doc-
trine of cy pres.'
The principle concept of cy pres is that a charitable trust does not fail
simply because there is no identifiable recipient. The certainty requirement
is satisfied by a designation of the purpose of the bequest.
West Virginia Code section 35-2-2 states in part that "[n]o conveyance, de-
vise, dedication, gift, grant or bequest ... [to a charitable trust described in
section 35-2-1] shall fail or be declared void for insufficient designation of the
beneficiaries in or the objects of any trust." Under the authority of the stat-
ute, a circuit court, upon petition, has full power to appoint a trustee to ex-
ecute the bequest.'
The court's determination of the issues in Teubert strongly suggests that
challenges to holographic wills will face an uncertain future, although a
stricter application of the court's two-step analysis in the field of extrinsic
evidence could lead to increased emphasis on the document alone. Charitable
bequests that fall within the protection of the statutory cy pres doctrine will
be extremely difficult to impeach.
VIII. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSIONS
Kaufman v. Planning and Zoning Commission of Fairmont, 298 S.E.2d 148 (W.
Va. 1982).
The West Virginia Legislature, recognizing the need in a complex era to
avoid the haphazard growth of a simpler time, enacted Article 24 of Chapter
8 of the West Virginia Code. That segment of the Code legalized the use of
planning and zoning commissions by units of local government and provided
regulations to govern their proper functions.
The principle regulatory power of a planning commission is derived from
West Virginia Code section 8-24-28,2" which grants to the commission the au-
thority to deny plat approval to any projected development that is not in ac-
"' W. VA. CODE § 35-2-1 (1966). The statute lists the uses that invoke the cy pres doctrine. In-
cluded are "any other benevolent or charitable institution, association or purpose."
W . VA. CODE § 35-2-2 (1966) provides in part:
No conveyance, devise, dedication, gift, grant or bequest hereafter made for any of
the uses set forth in the preceding section [§ 35-2-1] shall fail or be declared void for in-
sufficient designation of the beneficiaries in, or the objects of, any trust annexed to such
conveyance.
"' 298 S.E.2d at 464.
,, Id. at 465 n.6.
'W W. VA. CODE § 8-24-28 (1976).
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cordance with an existing comprehensive plan. The criteria to be applied in
judging those plats are stated in West Virginia Code Section 8-24-30,12I which
says in part: "Distribution of population and traffic in a manner tending to
create conditions favorable to health, safety, convenience and the harmonious
development of the municipality .... "(emphasis supplied)
The words "harmonious development" have provoked great measures of
disharmony, as the courts and local government have grappled over the pro-
per extent of what initially appeared to be a broad grant of authority. The
case of Kaufman v. Planning and Zoning Commission of Fairmont' may have
resolved the issue by virtually declaring the phrase to be unconstitutionally
vague.
The case arose from the Fairmont Planning Commission's denial of plat
approval to Gold Construction Company. Gold planned to build low-income
housing on land purchased from Henry Kaufman. The housing met local zon-
ing restrictions, but it nevertheless invoked loud outcries from local property
owners who feared property values would decline if low-income housing were
built in the area.12'
Gold twice attempted to gain plat approval. The initial effort was re-
buffed on technical grounds. During a second hearing, after Gold had cor-
rected the technical flaws, the Commission allowed local residents to testify
on decreased property values, the nature of low-income renters and the likeli-
hood that public housing would deteriorate. The Commission then denied the
plat a second time, citing its authority to rule on considerations of "harmon-
ious development."
124
Well before Kaufman, the court had expressed misgivings about the ex-
tent of the grant of power under section 8-24-30. In Singer v. Davenport" the
court demanded that a planning commission detail the grounds on which it
denied plats.2 6 Inherent in that ruling was a belief that local government
must not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner that serves to mislead
rather than guide its citizens.
Expanding upon the Singer doctrine, the court in Kaufman ruled that the
phrase "harmonious development" lacked the specificity necessary to ade-
quately notify persons seeking plat approval of what they must demonstrate
before a planning commission."i As a corollary to that determination, the
121 W. VA. CODE § 8-23-30 (1976).
12 298 S.E.2d 148 (W. Va. 1982).
" Id. at 150-51.
124 Id. at 151.
12 264 S.E.2d 637 (W. Va. 1980).
" Id. at 641.
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court ruled that local municipalities must specify the ingredients of "harmon-
ious development" as they apply to plat approval before they can rely on the
statute. '28
Although unnecessary to its determination of the principle issue in the
case, the court also considered the proper nature of evidence that a planning
commission should accept. It found that since plat approval was governed by
law, the determination must be made according to proper evidence. Commis-
sioners may not rely on personal experience or on evidence not sanctioned by
law. In Kaufman, it was, therefore, improper for the Commission to hear, on
the record, the complaints of local residents that did not address a specified
ground for plat approval.'9
The court also took pains to establish that decisions of planning commis-
sions are subject to a higher level of judicial scrutiny than zoning commis-
sions. Since planning commission decisions are administrative rather than
legislative, the "fairly debatable" standard of review suggested in Anderson
v. City of Wheeling3 ' does not apply. 3'
The power of planning commissions in West Virginia has undergone a
sharp reduction at the hands of the Kaufman court. Notwithstanding the
broad statutory language of the West Virginia Code, it is clear that future de-
cisions of such panels must be held within tight constraints. The court has
driven a stake through the heart of "harmonious development."
There is another aspect of the Kaufman decision that should give local
governments pause. The court barely concealed its distaste for criticism upon
low-income housing when it noted that "the law does not permit planning to
be used as an economic barrier."'32
No authority was cited for such a sweeping pronouncement. It may be ar-
gued that the statement elevates social conscience to force of law. It is appar-
ent that the court shares the belief of certain commentators that zoning and
planning regulations have been unfairly utilized to discriminate against the
economically deprived.33 Opposition to such regulations has generally relied
on claims of constitutional equal protection. West Virginia may well be in the
process of developing its own remedy for those claiming economic discrimina-
1,2 Id. at 155.
12 Id. at 156.
122 150 W. Va. 689, 149 S.E.2d 243 (1966). The court in Anderson held that "if the decision of
the zoning authorities is fairly debatable the courts will not interfere with such decision." Id. at
698, 149 S.E.2d at 249. It is clear from Kaufman that this liberal standard of judicial review will
not be applicable when planning commission activities are in question.
131 298 S.E.2d at 157.
132 Id. at 158.
' Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21
STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969).
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tion, although it is entirely uncertain on what theory the relief is being of-
fered.
Local governments should, therefore, not assume that mere specificity
will satisfy the Kaufman limitation on "harmonious development" regula-
tions. The court's hostility toward covert discrimination in the guise of com-
munity planning is beyond question. Regulations that have an economically
discriminatory impact will be scrutinized very carefully.
An open question remains concerning whether the court will extend its
concern for the economically underprivileged to regulations that affect
groups claiming social discrimination. Will the court permit planning or zon-
ing regulations that bar facilities for alcoholics, battered women, juveniles, or
the mentally ill? The Kaufman holding gives no unequivocal answer, but
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